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KAREN DIANE ANDERSON BAGGS, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND CROSS APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE (M- ASK 
Appellant brought suit against Respondent to do-
mesticate a Wyoming Divorce Decree and to obtain judg-
ment for accrued child support and attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 5, 1973 Appellant obtained judgment by 
default domesticating a Wyoming Decree of Divorce and 
obtaining judgment for accrued child support in the sum 
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of $1,900.00, together with Court costs of $24.30 and 
attorney's fees of $300.00. Said judgment was set aside 
March 5, 1973, and the case was tried before the Honor-
able Calvin Gould, sitting without a jury, on May 8,1973. 
On May 25, 1973 judgment was granted domesticating 
the Wyoming Divorce Decree and awarding Appellant 
child support accruing from December, 1971 through 
April, 1973, in the sum of $3,300.00. Each of the parties 
were ordered to pay his own costs and attorney's fees. 
Said judgment was thereafter amended on June 29, 1973, 
disallowing the child support accruing prior to July 25, 
1972, and awarding judgnient in favor of Appellant for 
child support accruing from July 25, 1972 through April 
25, 1973, in the sum of $1,800.00 with the provision that 
Appellant was enjoined from garnishing or executing 
against Respondent's assets or from otherwise enforcing 
said judgment so long as Respondent pays at least $100.00 
per month on said judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent and Cross Appellant seeks affirmation 
of the judgment denying Appellant child support accru-
ing from December, 1971 through July 25, 1972, together 
with the decision that Appellant is not entitled to attor-
ney's fees herein. Said Respondent and Cross Appellant 
seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment awarding 
Appellant child support which accrued between July 25, 
1972 and December 14, 1972. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent and Cross Appellant, herein-
aftter referred to as Respondent, does not agree fully wilh 
the Statement of Facts as presented by Appellant ami 
will herein recite his interpretation of the facts and will 
specifically refute facts set forth in Appellant's brief 
which he controverts. 
On June 24, 1970, Respondent was awarded a Decree 
of Divorce against Appellant in Natrona County, Wyom-
ing. Appellant was awarded custody of the three minor 
children of the parties, together with $200.00 per month 
child support. Respondent paid said child support regu-
larly until October, 1971, when Appellant made plans 
to remarry. Sometime prior to Novembei I, i^TL Re-
spondent met with Appellant's fiau.vu, Kichir Ri . 
and discussed the role each would play regarding ^ 
children of the parties in the future. Mr. Baggs advised 
Respondent that he did not want Respondent to visit 
the children thereafter nor did he want his assistance in 
the form of child support (T - 50-51). On November 1, 
1971, Appellant and Respondent met and agreed that Re-
spondent would not visit the children in the future and 
he would be relieved of all child support obligations "'' 
- 52 & R - 52). Two written memorandums of said agi 
ment were signed by both of the parties, one being on 
the last page of a copy of the Wyoming Divorce Decree 
and the other being on a paper napkin. Contrary to 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, there is no evidence that 
she did not intend to relieve Respondent of his obligation 
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of child support. On the contrary, Appellant testified 
that she was sober at the time she entered into the agree-
ment and knew what she was doing (T - 32). There was 
no coercion or force of any type used to induce her to 
enter into the agreement (T - 52). When Appellant 
signed the memorandum, she clearly knew she was sign-
ing a release and even copied it over on a napkin so she 
would have it available to know what she had signed (T 
-35) . 
To this point there had been no discussion between 
the parties regarding adoption of the children by Appel-
lant's future husband. Approximately one week before 
Appellant's remarriage on November 19, 1971, the par-
ties met at lunch with Appellant's fiancee, Richie Baggs, 
and there was some discussion at that time regarding the 
possibility of a future adoption of the children by Mr. 
Baggs. Respondent did not at that time reject the idea 
(T - 61) but there was no serious discussion or any real 
conversation about an adoption until June, 1972 (T -
23). 
In reliance upon the November 1, 1971 agreement, 
Appellant stopped visiting the children and did not see 
them again until January, 1973. In reliance upon the 
agreement he also stopped paying child support (T - 52). 
In further reliance upon said agreement, Respondent 
changed his circumstances materially. He moved from 
a $40.00 per month apartment and signed a year's lease 
on another apartment for $175.00 per month (T - 53-54). 
In the summer of 1972, he also purchased a new automo-
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bile at a cost of $3,750.00 with monthly payments of 
$118.00 per month (T - 54 & T - 64). In February, 1972, 
he incurerd a debt for $600.00 on furniture with monthly 
payments of $25.60 (T - 65). Then in August, 1972, he 
incurred a debt Consolidation Loan in the sum of $1,200.00 
with monthly payments of $90.00 per month (T - 65). 
Respondent would not have changed his circumstances 
and incurred said debts had he not understood that he 
had been relieved of child support payments of $200.00 
per month (T - 54). 
In June, 1972, Appellant and her husband retained 
Attorney James Z. Davis to file a petition for adoption 
of the children by Mr. Baggs (T - 41). There was no 
discussion at that time regarding the collection of sup-
port arrearages and the Baggs' only purpose in retaining 
the attorney was to commence adoption proceedings (T 
- 42, 43). At that point, Appellant and her husband were 
still acquiescing in the non-payment of support by Re-
spondent and anticipated that Mr. Baggs would adopt 
the children (T - 44). 
During June, 1972, the first serious conversations be-
tween the parties about adoption of the children by Mr. 
Baggs were held (T - 23, 24) and at that time Respon-
dent appeared somewhat hesitant about consenting to an 
adoption (T - 24). Only after this hesitancy was made 
known did Appellant make demand for the payment of 
accrued child support (T - 47). This was done formally 
by letter from Appellant's attorney to Respondent dated 
July 25, 1972. From the date of the agreement between 
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the parties on November 1, 1971, until July, 1972, no 
request was made of Respondent for child support. 
On September 14, 1972, Appellant's attorney again 
made demand on Respondent for accrued support, and 
on September 27, 1972, Appellant filed a Complaint 
against Respondent to domesticate the Wyoming Divorce 
Decree and to obtain a judgment for accrued child sup-
port, but Respondent was not served with process at 
that time. Thereafter, further conversations were held 
regarding the possibility of adoption and finally in the 
early part of December, 1972, Respondent agreed that 
he would go to Court and consent to an adoption. When 
Respondent finally got to Court, he could not bring him-
self to consent to the adoption, and on December 14,1972, 
shortly after his refusal to consent to the adoption in 
Court, Respondent was served with the Complaint which 
had been filed on September 27,1972. 
During the entire period that Respondent paid no 
child support to Appellant the children were supported 
by Appellant's new husband who provided for all of their 
material needs and was very generous in his financial 
assistance. The children did not want for any of the 
necessities of life and Mr. Baggs provided all of their 
comforts including a new home, two automobiles, and 
a Country Club membership (T - 20). During this period 
Mr. Baggs was employed as a stockbroker with Merrill, 
Lynch, and had a salary of $700.00 per month until May, 
1972, when he was raised to $800.00 per month (T - 40, 
41). 
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Judgment by default was entered against Respon-
dent on aJnuary 5, 1973, wherein the Wyoming Divorce 
Decree was made the judgment of the Utah Court and 
judgment for $1,900.00 delinquent support was entered 
against Respondent, together with Court costs of $24.30 
and attorney's fees of $300.00 (R - 16). Pursuant to Re-
spondent's Motion and hearing thereon, said default 
judgment was set aside on March 5, 1973 (R - 50). On 
May 8, 1973, the case was tried in the District Court of 
Weber County before the Honorable Calvin Gould and 
on May 25, 1973, said Court domesticated the Wyoming 
Divorce Decree and granted judgment in favor of Appel-
lant for child support accruing from December, 1971 
through April, 1973, in the sum of $3,300.00. Each of the 
parties was ordered to pay his own costs and attorney's 
fees (R - 55, 56). Six days thereafter, on May 31, 1973, 
Respondent filed his Motion to Amend Judgment which 
was heard on June 20, 1973, and pursuant thereto the 
judgment was amended on June 29, 1973, disallow-
ing the support accruing prior to July 25, 1972, on 
the grounds that Respondent relied on the agreement 
between the parties that he would not be required to 
pay support in exchange for not visiting the children and 
Appellant made no demand for payment of support dur-
ing said period and Respondent changed his position by 
increasing his standard of living and incurring additional 
expenses in reliance thereon. (See Findings, Facts and 
Conclusions of Law dated February 14, 1974.) Judgment 
against Respondent was allowed to stand for child sup-
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port accruing from July 25, 1972 through April 25, 1973 
in the sum of $1,800.00 and Appellant was enjoined from 
garnishing or executing against Respondent's assets or 
from otherwise enforcing said judgment so long as Re-
spondent pays at least $100.00 per month on said judg-
ment (R-93) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS ES-
TOPPED FROM ENFORCING THE PAY-
MENT OF BACK INSTALLMENTS OF 
CHILD SUPPORT ACCRUING FROM DE-
CEMBER, 1971 THROUGH JULY, 1972. 
Respondent will answer Points I and II of Appel-
lant's Argument together. 
It is recognized by a majority of the Courts in the 
United States that a husband may not be required to pay 
past due installments of child support on the grounds of 
laches or acquiescence on the part of the wife. See 137 
A. L. R. 886 where it is stated: 
"It would seem, from a perusal of the cases, 
that it is recognized by at least a majority of 
the courts that circumstances may be such as to 
enable a husband to avoid payment of perma-
nent alimony or support and maintenance of 
children allowed by decree or order of court, or 
at any rate payment of past due installments 
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thereof, on the ground of laches or acquiescence 
on the part of the wife." 
This is further emphasized in 57 A. L. R. 2d 1143 
where it is stated: 
"There is ample authority in support of the 
proposition that an agreement between divorced 
spouses by which the former husband, for a valid 
consideration, is released from his obligations 
to pay child support to his former wife as previ-
ously decreed in the divorce suit, is valid as 
between the former spouses, and precludes her 
from enforcing the child support provisions of 
the decree." (Cases cited) 
The annotation goes on to state on page 1144: 
"More specifically, it has been held that the 
former wife may release her husband from his 
obligations under the child support provisions 
of a divorce decree so long as the interests of the 
child are not affected and only an obligation per-
sonal to her is involved." (Cases cited including 
the Utah case of Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 
224, 300 P. 2d 596 [1956].) 
Utah follows the majority rule and in the case of 
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596 (1956); 
Rehearing, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P. 2d 421 (1959), the facts 
are remarkably similar to those in the instant case. There, 
the husband obtained a decree of divorce from the wife, 
who was awarded custody of their minor child and 
awarded $35.00 per month child support. Some years 
after the divorce was granted the wife sought to obtain 
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a judgment against the husband for accrued child sup-
port and the husband alleged that his failure to make 
support payments was due to the fact that the wife had 
previously told him that she was married and her new 
husband would support the child and that all she wanted 
from the father was that he should refrain from trying 
to see her or the child. Because of such representations, 
the father alleged he had remarried and taken on other 
obligations which he would not have undertaken had he 
known she would demand all moneys which were payable 
under the decree. 
The trial Court found that the husband had not made 
the payments as ordered by the divorce decree from June, 
1947 until June, 1955, and held that the wife was en-
titled to a judgment for amounts due for that period for 
the use and benefit of the child. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial Court 
and remanded the case for findings on the issues of laches, 
acquiescence or estoppel. 
On page 598 of 300 P. 2d the Court stated: 
"In Price v. Price, we held that because the 
state is interested in the child's welfare the par-
ents cannot effectively release future payments 
of support money by agreeing with the other to 
that effect. However, this does not mean that 
a mother may not by her actions or representa-
tions, or both, preclude herself from recovering 
past due installments of support money to reim-
burse her for money which she has spent for the 
support of the child. Where the father's failure 
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to make such payments was induced by her rep-
resentations or actions and where as a result of 
such actions or representations the father has 
been lulled into failing to make such payments 
and into changing his position which he would 
not have done but for such representations, and 
that as a result of such failure to pay and change 
in his conditions it will cause him great hardship 
and injustice if she is allowed to enforce the pay-
ment of such back installments, she may be 
thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of 
such back installments." (Last emphasis added,) 
The Court then went on to state that: 
"If the child has been the beneficiary of 
equivalent support and education so that the 
mother is entitled to receive all of said past due 
support money, she should be free to release, 
compromise or waive that which is hers. But if 
the child has been provided bare shelter and 
food and denied the benefit of proper clothes 
and dental and medical care, then the mother 
should not be free to waive that portion of past 
due support money that the child has not re-
ceived. The authorities cited above hold that 
this doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is 
the prerogative of the trial court to determine 
these facts and if he finds that facts exist to 
justify equitable estoppel, he should apply that 
doctrine and relieve the father from payment of 
the installments to the extent indicated." 
Upon rehearing, the trial Court held that the wife 
was estopped from claiming any payments for the period 
from June, 1947 to and including December 31, 1950, 
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and judgment was entered accordingly. This judgment 
was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in 1959 at 9 
Utah 2d 160, 340 P. 2d 421. 
In the instant case, the children have been well pro-
vided with all of their material needs by their mother's 
second husband and have not been denied the benefit 
of proper clothes and dental and medical care. Their com-
forts included a new home, two automobiles and a Coun-
try Club membership (T - 20). During this period Mr. 
Baggs had an income between $700.00 and $800.00 per 
month (T - 40, 41). It is clear in the instant case that 
the children have been the beneficiary of equivalent sup-
port and education so that their mother would be en-
titled to receive all of the past due support money to use 
as she sees fit, and accordingly she should be free to 
release, compromise, or waive that which is hers. 
The trial Court herein, in accordance with the Larsen 
case, correctly found that the Respondent relied upon the 
representations of Appellant and her second husband to 
the effect that they would not expect Respondent to pay 
child support in consideration of him not visiting the 
children and leaving them alone. The Court further cor-
rectly found that in reliance thereon Respondent ceased 
visiting the children,stopped the payment of child sup-
port, and changed his circumstances by incurring finan-
cial indebtedness which he would not have taken on had 
he understood he still had a responsibility to support the 
children. 
Appellant's argument that the agreement of Novem-
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ber 1, 1971 is not a valid contract, is immaterial inasmuch 
as it is not necessary that there be a valid contract in 
order to constitute an estoppel. In the Larsen case the 
Court did not question whether the agreement of the 
wife to forego the payment of child support in exchange 
for the husband not visiting the children constituted a 
valid contract, but the Court rather determined that 
such a representation by the wife which caused the hus-
band to change his circumstances to his detriment in re-
liance thereon estopped the wife from later coming back 
and collecting the accrued support. The trial Court was 
correct in determining that the same rule is applicable in 
the instant case. 
Appellant's argument that the agreement was ex-
torted from Appellant under duress is not valid. Appel-
lant's own testimony was that she was sober at the time 
she entered into the agreement and knew what she was 
doing (T - 32) and Respondent testified that there was 
no coercion or force of any type used to induce Appellant 
to enter into the agreement (T - 52). Had Appellant 
actually been coerced into making the agreement because 
of her need of money, she could have repudiated the 
agreement as soon as she received the money, but this 
she never did. The trial Judge, who was present and able 
to determine the demeanor of the parties, was correct in 
determining that there was no duress. 
Appellant's argument that under the case of Price 
v. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P. 2d 1044 (1955), future 
support cannot be the subject of a bargain and sale be-
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tween husband and wife, is correct. This rule, however, 
is not applicable in the present case as the question here, 
as in the Larsen case, is whether Appellant is estopped 
from collecting accrued child support. Appellant's Com-
plaint filed in September, 1972, did not seek the collec-
tion of future support but rather sought to collect child 
support which had accrued prior thereto. Appellant's 
allegation found on page 6 of her brief that "In the in-
stant case, defendant is relying on an agreement which 
related in no way to arrearages, but to future payments," 
is just not true. 
Appellant's reference in Point II of her argument 
that plaintiff's acquiescence in the instant case was for 
a period of only seven months "while all cases indulging 
an estoppel theory invariably involve many years of ac-
quiescence," is without merit.. In none of the cases cited 
by Appellant does the Court state that an acquiescence 
in the non-payment of support must continue for a stated 
period of time in order to constitute a valid estoppel. 
Whether the acquiescence is for a period of one month 
or for a period of ten years is completely immaterial. 
Appellant's argument on page 7 of her brief that the 
case of Larsen v. Larsen has been "thoroughly immascu-
lated by later cases" is not true. None of the cases cited 
by Appellant overrule or in any way modify the holding 
of the Larsen case and it has stood without dispute as 
the law in this state since 1956. 
The case of French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 
P. 2d 315 (1965), cited on pages 6 and 7 of Appellant's 
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brief holds that the failure of a former wife to request 
support payments from her former husband for a pro-
longed period does not raise an estoppel and the Court 
distinguished the Larsen case and held that "It (Larsen) 
has no application to the facts of this (French) case." 
(Parenthetical insertions added.) It is interesting to note 
that two of the Justices (Crockett, J. and McDonough, 
J.) dissented in the French case and concluded that even 
under the facts of that case the former wife should not 
have been able to collect delinquent support. 
The Utah Supreme Court also distinguished the case 
of McClure v. Dowell, 15 Utah 2d 324, 392 P. 2d 624 
(1964), cited on pages 6 and 7 of Appellant's brief, from 
the Larsen case. In the McClure case the former husband 
of the plaintiff did not make support payments for a per-
iod of two years because plaintiff concealed herself with 
the children and defendant did not know where to pay 
the support. The Utah Supreme Court again distinguished 
the Larsen case and stated that Larsen was "inapropos 
as applied to the facts of this case." The facts of the 
McClure case also make it inapropos as applied to the 
facts of the instant case. 
The case of Hall v. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, 326 P. 2d 
707 (1958), cited on page 7 of Appellant's brief is also 
distinguished from the Larsen case. In the Hall case the 
mother of the children concealed her whereabouts from 
the father and claimed that she did not "seek out defen-
dant to require payment because she was trying to en-
joy a peaceful life and it was not worth it to her at the 
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time." The father in that case attempted to rely on the 
Larsen case to create an estoppel. The Court held that 
there was no "representation to defendant that he would 
not be held accountable for the support money, as was 
the basis of the Larsen decision," and the Court refused 
to find an estoppel. The facts of the instant case are com-
pletely different from those in Hall but are almost identi-
cal to the facts in Larsen, as previously indicated. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DO-
MESTICATING THE WYOMING DECREE 
AND FOR HER SUBSEQUENT LEGAL AC-
TION IN UTAH. 
There was no evidence whatsoever presented at the 
trial of this case in support of Appellant's prayer for 
$300.00 attorney's fees in domesticating the Wyoming 
decree and seeking accrued support. The law does not 
provide that a woman is inherently entitled to attorney's 
fees simply because the case is one involving a matrimon-
ial action. The general rule is that a wife is not entitled 
to an allowance as suit money to maintain her divorce 
suit where she has sufficient means of her own. See 35 
A. L. R. 1101. The financial circumstances of the parties 
is a factor to be given great weight by the Court. See 
24 Am. Jur. 2d 718, wherein it is stated as follows: 
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"The financial circumstances of the parties 
have an important bearing on the questions 
whether attorney's fees and suit money should 
be awarded and, if so, how much. The primary 
rule is that the making of such allowances to a 
wife depends upon her needs and the ability of 
husband to satisfy them. For example, if the 
wife is the plaintiff, the court will award reason-
able attorney's fees and suit money if she is 
without funds and her husband has sufficient 
means to stand the expense." (Emphasis added) 
In the Utah case of Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P. 
2d 681, 119 Utah 504 (1951), it is stated that: 
"The reason for permitting a wife suit money 
to defend an action for divorce rests on the 
ground that the wife normally has no separate 
estate from which to pay for bringing or defend-
ing the action . . . Not to allow the wife expenses 
and counsel fees would in the majority of cases 
work an injustice by denying her the power to 
enforce any marital right she may have." 
In the instant case, Appellant has remarried, is living 
in a new home, has a membership to the Country Club, 
is able to drive two automobiles, and the Court did not 
err in finding that she has sufficient means to pay her 
own attorney's fees incurred in these proceedings. 
It is further stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d 695, as follows: 
"Whether an allowance of suit money and 
counsel fees shall be paid in the case at bar 
rests in the judicial discretion of the court, to 
be exercised in view of the conditions and cir-
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cumstances of each case, and an abuse of the 
discretion is necessarily subject to review. Un-
less, however, there is clearly an abuse of the 
discretion, the decree will not ordinarily be dis-
turbed on appeal" (Emphasis added) 
There is no evidence in the present case that the 
trial Court abused its discretion in refusing Appellant's 
prayer for attorney's fees. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO FIND THAT RESPONDENT 
INDUCED APPELLANT TO TEMPORAR-
ILY FOREGO ENFORCEMENT OF HIS 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION BY AGREEING 
TO ALLOW APPELLANT'S HUSBAND TO 
ADOPT THE CHILDREN. 
The agreement entered into between the parties on 
November 1, 1971, did not contemplate in any way that 
there would ever be an adoption of the children by Ap-
pellant's new husband. The verbal agreement between 
the parties was merely that Respondent would forego 
his right to visit the children and would be relieved of 
further obligation to pay child support on their behalf. 
This was confirmed by the written memorandum which 
provides that Respondent would be absolved of all of his 
responsibilities under the decree (including child sup-
port) and would give up all rights under the decree (in-
cluding visitation). There was never any discussion be-
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tween the parties regarding the adoption of the children 
until after the agreement was entered into and the dis-
cussion of adoption was only of a casual nature until 
June, 1972, when the first serious discussions about adop-
tion took place (T-23) . 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
HEARING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT. 
The trial Court entered its order awarding Appellant 
judgment for all requested arrearages on May 25, 1973. 
Respondent filed his Motion to Amend Judgment six 
days thereafter, on May 31, 1973, well within the ten 
days permitted by Rule 59 (e) U. R. C. P. 
Rule 59 (a) requires only that a cause set out therein 
must be presented in order for the Court to grant a new 
trial. There is no such requirement that one of the causes 
be shown in order to justify an alteration or amendment 
of judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e). 
Notwithstanding this, Respondent's Motion to 
Amend Judgment clearly recited that the "judgment is 
contrary to and against Utah law as set forth in the Utah 
cases . . ." (R - 82). Rule 59 (a) (6) states that one of 
the causes for a new trial is "Insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against 
law." (Emphasis added.) Respondent's Motion to Amend 
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clearly stated that its cause was that the judgment was 
contrary to and against Utah law. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FIND-
ING THAT APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED 
FROM COLLECTING CHILD SUPPORT 
WHICH ACCRUED FROM JULY 25, 1972 
UNTIL DECEMBER 14, 1972. 
The trial Court was correct in finding an acquiescence 
by Appellant in the non-payment of support by Respon-
dent through July 25, 1972 because there was no demand 
made for the payment of support until that time. Re-
spondent submits that the acquiescence in non-payment 
by Appellant actually continued until December 14, 1972 
when Respondent was served with Appellant's Complaint 
to domesticate the Wyoming Divorce Decree. Although 
Appellant made formal request through her attorney for 
the payment of accrued support on July 25, 1972 and 
again on September 14,1972, neither of the parties actual-
ly construed this as a demand for support, but rather as 
a means of pressuring Respondent into consenting to an 
adoption (T - 55). That Appellant had this intention is 
clearly evidenced by her answer to the question: 
"So you led him to believe along here that what 
you wanted was a consent to the adoption, and 
you would not pursue the matter of back sup-
port so long as he paid the attorney's fees in 
connection with the adoption? 
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Answer: Yes, sir" ( T - 2 8 ) . 
When Appellant's attorney again made written re-
quest for the payment of accrued support on September 
14, 1972, it is clear that the purpose of this demand was 
to coerce Respondent into consenting to an adoption as 
evidence by the fact that on September 29, 1972, Appel-
lant and her attorney executed a release, wherein, for the 
consideration of $322.00 attorney's fees for the adoption, 
they released all claims against Respondent for support 
arrearages (R - 60 & T - 28). Contrary to Appellant's 
Statement of Facts there is no evidence that Respondent 
agreed to begin payments and to make up the arrearages. 
The filing of Appellant's Complaint on September 
27, 1972 cannot be construed as a demand for the pay-
ment of accrued support inasmuch as Respondent was not 
even aware that the Complaint was filed until he was 
served with process on December 14, 1972. At the time 
Respondent went to Court in the early part of December, 
1972, to consent to an adoption Appellant was still ac-
quiescing in the non-payment of support by Respondent 
and expected only that he would pay attorney's fees in 
connection with the adoption. This is evidenced by 
Appellant's answers to the following questions: 
"Q. Well now, there was an understanding, was 
there not, finally that he would come into Court 
and would consent to the adoption. And at that 
point there was no talk about him having to pay 
you any money in the way of delinquent amounts, 
was there? 
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A. Right. 
Q. It was just a matter of him coming into 
Court and agreeing to the adoption, isn't that 
true? 
A. We did ask him for the attorney's fees we 
had entailed since June when one day he wanted 
to sign and the next he didn't. 
Q. I see. Your understanding at that point 
was that you wanted him to pay your attorney's 
fees in connection with the adoption as well? 
A. Yes" (T - 27, 28). 
When Respondent finally got to Court he could not 
bring himself to consent to the adoption. 
"Q. What happened when you got here? What 
was your attitude when you got here? 
A. Well, I felt like I was doing the wrong thing 
and a bad thing, and I couldn't — when I got 
there, I couldn't do it. 
Q. What is your feeling about a relationship 
with your children at the present time? 
A. That I won't sign the adoption papers, and 
that I want to see them very often" (T - 56). 
It is clear from the facts that had Respondent agreed 
to the adoption at the Court hearing in December, 1972, 
Appellant would not thereafter have served the Com-
plaint to collect accrued child support and Respondent 
submits that the first and only conduct of Appellant that 
was construed by either party as a formal demand for 
the payment of support was the serving of the Complaint 
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upon Respondent on December 14,1972. Up to that point 
he had continuously been led to believe that he would 
not be required to pay accrued child support. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court correctly ruled that Appellant was 
estopped from collecting child support which accrued be-
tween December, 1971 and July 25, 1972, and the Court 
was further correct in amending its original judgment 
to this effect. The trial Court further ruled correctly that 
Appellant was not entitled to attorney's fees in these 
proceedings. 
The trial Court erred, however, in ruling that Appel-
lant was not estopped from collecting child support which 
accrued from July 25, 1972 through December 14, 1972, 
and it is respectfully submitted that the facts and law 
compel a reversal of the trial Court's ruling that Appellant 
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